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We model the decision by two contestants to select one of two conict
resolution forums in which to address their conct; alternative dispute reso-
lution (ADR) or litigation. Given a forum, we represent the partiesbehavior
by a Tullock contest. Because of the additional constraints disputants face
in courts, we assume that the cost structure of providing e¤ective legal argu-
ments is higher under litigation. Paradoxically, litigation may be procedu-
rally more e¢ cient in equilibrium. The nal choice of the parties is based on
their respective utility and we show that a tension may arise with procedural
e¢ ciency. Finally, we also show that the timing of the decision of the conict
resolution mechanism (before or after the conct arises) a¤ects the choices
the parties make.
1 Introduction
When a conict arises, disputants usually attempt to negotiate and resolve
the issue directly. If this fails, a litigation procedure where a civil court de-
cides the outcome of the case is the standard dispute resolution process of
modern justice systems. However, in many countries the last decades have
witnessed a decrease in the e¤ectiveness of this arrangement due to signi-
cantly higher numbers of court hearings, and consequently greater delays in
handing down judgments.
This situation has led to increased interest in the use of Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution (ADR) schemes within existing legal frameworks, but also
attempts have been made to adjust the respective legal structures to fos-
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ter the use of ADR.1 For instance, the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) reports considerable increases in requests for arbitration and commer-
cial mediation.2 European Directive 2013/11/EU seeks to promote ADR in
the consumer sphere, and an EU-wide online platform will be set up by 2016
for on-line dispute resolution.
In practice, the implementation of ADR, the means to achieve it and
the success thereof have been very contrasted for various types of problem.
For instance, in commercial disputes, arbitration has successfully established
itself in the laissez faire environment in the tradition of the Lex Mercato-
ria. Commercial contractors often include of themselves a clause on the
choice of dispute resolution forum in their initial agreement. At the other
extreme, there are situations where the law makes ADR mandatory in some
jurisdictions. For instance, in France, Australia, and the U.K., mediation or
conciliation are mandatory before a hearing in labour law courts. There are
also cases where a judge is granted the power to suggest or impose ADR on
some litigants once a conict arises.
As noted by a World Bank publication (World Bank, 2005, p.3), this
raises a natural question as to whether court-connected alternative dispute
resolution (...) should be voluntary or mandatory. In particular, should
the court have the power to order the two parties to try alternative dispute
resolution even if one thinks it will be futile? Furthermore, the question
arises as to who should decide whether the parties should use ADR or to go
to court; the parties to a conict or a third person like the judge? These ques-
tions are at the center of our investigation. Moreover, we analyze a tension
which may arise between the partiesdecisions and procedural e¢ ciency.
In our analysis, we abstract from the characteristics of the many rules
summarized under the heading ADR. Despite this level of abstraction, we
emphasize four signicant di¤erences between ADR and courts. First, as
noted by Shavell (1995), proceedings in civil courts typically impose a more
formal structure based on the Code of Civil Procedure of the jurisdiction
concerned. For instance, disputes have to follow prescribed steps which reg-
ulate the collection and presentation of information, require legal justication
of claims and impose many delays. A second divergence is that information
presented in courts generally becomes public knowledge whereas ADR allows
information and the decision resulting from the conict to remain conden-
1ADR refers to any means of settling disputes outside of the courtroom requiring the
intervention of an external third-party (i.e. ADR does not include standard out-of-the
court settlement). For more details on these mechanisms, see
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alternative_dispute_resolution. In particular, ADR
typically includes early neutral evaluation, conciliation, mediation, and arbitration.
2Last year alone, ICC reported an increase of 49,5% over 5 years.
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tial (if so desired by the parties). A further di¤erence is that courts are
generally less specialized than ADR forums. As a result, courts more often
seem required to call on outside expertise. Finally, in all modern countries,
litigation is the fallback position; if parties cannot agree on ADR, ghting
the conict in a civil court is the last resort.
These di¤erences have ramications for the costs associated with the pro-
duction of a legal argument under the respective dispute resolution forum and
ultimately for the choice between the courts or ADR. The production of a
legal argument includes all the legal activities that a party undertakes to
increase its chances of winning. These activities include searching for clear
evidence, legal information and jurisprudence that support the claim. In
doing so, it must take into account the restrictions imposed by the dispute
resolution forum. Finally, the associated costs follow from the mix of inputs
and their respective costs.
In our analysis, we follow the usual economic paradigm; we take as a
maintained hypothesis that for a given production level of an e¤ective le-
gal argument in a specic conict resolution forum, a party selects inputs
to minimize costs. The aforementioned additional constraints imposed by
the court system (more formalism, publicizing information, ...) imply that,
for the same level of production, costs and cost elasticity should be greater
than under ADR. This observation is the starting point of a stylized model
designed to study how the choice of a conict resolution forum is made.
In the analysis, we consider two possible timings for the choice between
ADR and litigation. We rst imagine a situation where the choice occurs
ex-post, that is after the conict arises. This timing is typical for tort cases
where the parties have no interaction prior to the occurrence of the harm. A
key characteristic of the ex-post choice is that the determination of a conict
resolution forum occurs at a point in time where most of the facts associated
with the partiesdisagreement have materialized. We also consider the al-
ternative possibility where parties decide ex-ante which forum to use in the
event of a future disagreement. This alternative timing ts the aforemen-
tioned cases of commercial disputes.
Once a conict resolution forum has been selected, and a controversy
arises, the parties must determine how much e¤ective e¤ort to produce in
order to maximize their respective payo¤s. In our analysis, we model the
resulting strategic interaction by a Tullock game. Despite the presumed cost
advantage of ADR, we nd that in the respective equilibrium parties may
spend less under litigation. Intuitively, the higher cost elasticity associated
with the court system disciplines the conict parties and reduces their ap-
petite for a legal contest. This generates countervailing cost e¤ects; using
litigation shifts the cost function upward, but reduces the input in the pro-
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duction of legal arguments. Whenever the latter e¤ect dominates, going to
court becomes procedurally e¢ cient.
From the point of view of contestants, however, what matters for the
choice between litigation and ADR is not procedural e¢ ciency, but rather
their expected utility associated with the respective forum. Solving for the
equilibrium choice, we nd a stark di¤erence between the ex-post and ex-ante
decision. In the former, in terms of procedural e¢ ciency parties litigate too
often. This result occurs because once the characteristics of the conict are
realized the partiesopposite interests tend to dominate the decision.
When the parties select the conict resolution forum ex-ante, it becomes
easier to align incentives. Intuitively, the parties average out over the dis-
tribution of meritoriousness in potential future conicts. This reduces the
tension emanating from the symmetric opposition of benets and refocus the
determination of the conict resolution forum on costs. In fact, we show that
the parties may now agree too often on ADR.
Our analysis is related to the large body of law and economics literature
which deals with conict resolution. Traditionally this literature models con-
icts as a two-step procedure, where parties rst try to settle and then go
to court if they fail to reach an agreement (Cooter and Ulen, 2012). With
perfect information, parties are expected to settle, to save on litigation costs.
Any agreement to settle the case will generate a surplus for the parties -
in the form of saved litigation costs - that the parties can divide between
themselves. The cost of legal procedures then has a positive impact on the
probability of settling the case (instead of litigating) because it increases the
bargaining surplus.3
Our paper departs from this approach on two main points. First, we con-
sider a Tullock game (Tullock (1980)), where parties make costly e¤orts to
increase their own likelihood of winning without side payments. In this re-
gard, our paper is related to recent law and economics literature that models
conicts in which agents can infuence the outcome by hiring lawyers, look-
ing for new evidence or ordering an expertise (Farmer and Pecorino, 1999;
Corchon, 2007), Luppi and Parisi (2012), Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2014)).
With this in mind, we will focus on the cost structure the parties support to
increase their own chances of winning, rather than on exogenous amounts of
litigation costs. This leads us to a surprising result compared to the previous
literature: litigation may still be attractive for disputants, even if the cost
structure for providing legal arguments is higher than for ADR. Second, we
3Following this literature, going to trial is often viewed as a procedural ine¢ ciency
resulting from negotiation failure. Sources of ine¢ ciencies may come from asymetric in-
formation, optimism, or other cognitive biases. See Hay and Spier (1998), Daughety and
Reinganum (2012) and, Daughety and Reinganum (2014) for surveys.
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focus on the choice the two disputants have to make to solve their conict,
when both litigation and ADR mechanisms are available. To our knowledge,
this question has not been explored in the law and economic literature up
to now, even though the public authorities continue to promote ADR as an
alternative to litigation.4
Our paper is also related to the more specic literature on alternative dis-
pute resolution. Shavell (1995) compares ex-ante ADR arrangements (made
before the dispute arises) or ex-post arrangements (made after the dispute
arises). This paper explores the social interest and the welfare consequences
of ADR. We depart from this analysis by modelling the individual choices of
the parties when they have to decide whether to use ADR or to litigate. Other
papers focus on how ADR may bring parties knowledge that they would not
otherwise learn (Mitusch and Strausz, 2005; Goltsman et al., 2007; Ivanov,
2010; Rahman and Obara, 2010; Strausz, 2012). However, we do not explore
informational problems here. Our interest rather bears on the cost structure
of the two procedures (ADR versus litigation).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 derives the Nash equilibrium of the Tullock game e¤ective
legal e¤ort. Section 4 compares the Nash equilibria associated with the court
system and ADR. Section 5 analyzes the ex-post and ex-ante choice of conict
resolution forum. Finally, section 6 provides a conclusion and discussion.
2 The Model
Consider two parties involved in a legal dispute over the allocation of a mon-
etary value D. For instance, the conict could be about which disputant
should pay for accidental damage. Alternatively, it could involve the alloca-
tion of a valuable resource in a commercial dispute. In order to address their
conict, the parties can use one of two dispute resolution forums; judicial
litigation or ADR that are denoted by m = L;A respectively.
Whatever a dispute resolution mechanism is used, the likelihood of win-
ning the conict is the outcome of a simultaneous move in a Tullock contest in
terms of respective variables referred to hereafter as e¤ective legal arguments.
The e¤ective legal argument produced by party i (or its legal counselor) is
denoted by ei  0, i = 1; 2. Following the logic of a Tullock game, we assume
4E.g. the recent report on ADR for the French Ministry of Justice (IGSJ (2015)); the
enactment of a Mediation Law (Legislative Decree 28/2010) in Italy which has led to a
wider use of ADR. Projects of ADR for on-line transactions are also promoted in the EU
member states. More broadly, international institutions also foster the use of ADR (World
Bank (2011), OECD (2014)).
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that given a vector (e1; e2) party i wins the contest with the probability
pi (e1; e2) =
8>><>>:
ei
e1 + e2
if e1 + e2 > 0
1
2
if e1 + e2 = 0
(1)
We use the terminology of an e¤ective legal argument to capture the intuition
that due to more formalism in court, litigation uses more resources than ADR
for the same level of ei.5
The resources underpinning the development of an e¤ective legal argu-
ment means that the production of ei will be associated with costs. These
costs cannot only depend on ei and the dispute resolution form employed,
but will also hinge on the relative merit of the respective claim denoted here-
after by i, i = 1; 2. By construction, the relative merit of the contestants
claim must be diametrically opposed; if in the case at hand one of the parties
contention is meritorious, it follows that the claim of its opponent must be
demeritorious. In order to model this anti-symmetry in the respective merit
of the contention, we dene
1 = 1   and 2 =  (2)
where  2 (0; 1). For instance, the case  = 1=2 yields 1 = 2 and represents
a legal dispute where the contestantsclaims appear to be equally valid. This
could arise either because the initial evidence happens to look balanced or it
could be due to a lack of legal clarity. A conict where the argument is more
meritorious for one of the parties can be represented by shifting  to either
end of the support.
In order to keep the mathematics to a minimum, we assume that the cost
function of e¤ective legal e¤ort takes the following form:
Cm(e; ) = Fm + 
e
m
m
; m = A;L (3)
where Fm denotes a xed cost parameter and m the associated cost elasticity
parameter.6 To gain an intuition as to how the di¤erent assumptions of the
5The terminology comes from labor economics where a distinction is often made be-
tween "labor input" measured by the number of hours someone works and "e¤ective labor"
which refers to what these hours produce (see e.g. Akerlof and Yellen 1990). In the cur-
rent context "e¤ort" is used for the lawyerslabor input whereas "e¤ective legal argument"
refers to the legal service produced therewith.
6One can generalize the ndings by replacing e
m
m with a strictly increasing convex
function km(e). All the results derived in the paper would extend provided that we
impose a level condition, kL(e) > kA(e) for all e > 0; and a requirement on the elasticity
"L(e) > "A(e) of the respective cost function.
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model work together, consider an increase in . Holding the e¤ective legal
arguments xed, party 1s costs go down while those of her opponent are
raised. Hence raising  should be interpreted as a boost in the merit of party
1s contention.
With respect to the cost parameters m and based on the maintained hy-
pothesis discussed in the introduction, we impose the following requirement:
Assumption 1: L > A  1 and
8e  0;8 2 (0; 1) ; FL +  e
L
L
> FA + 
e
A
A
: (4)
These conditions map the discussion in the introduction on the formalism
of legal courts as compared to the exibility of ADR. Intuitively, more formal-
ism means adding additional restrictions on the cost minimization problem
associated with the production of an e¤ective legal argument.7 This should
indeed generate both higher xed costs and larger cost elasticity for any ef-
fective legal argument. Finally, we postulate A  1 in order to ensure that
both cost functions are convex in e¤ective legal argument.
Before concluding the description of the model, a few remarks are in order
to some of the underlying assumptions. First, our framework nests the well
known model used by Farmer and Pecorino (1999) which were among the rst
authors to study equilibrium court costs using a Tullock game.8 A di¢ culty
to directly see the relationship between the two setups is that Farmer and
Pecorino did not explicitly model legal e¤ort and, instead, formulated the
winning probabilities in terms of the parties costs. To see the similarity
between the two approaches, suppose that in our model the parties agreed to
employ the conict resolution mechanism m and that the merit allocation is
characterized by . In order to derive the winning probabilities as a function
of costs, let us assume that party i decided to spend the amount cmi . We
7Many reports mention the formalism of legal courts compared to the exibility of
ADR. Consider the following examples. In October 2011 the World Banks note on
settling out of courtstates that ADR (compared to litigation) provides condentiality,
choice of neutral parties, more exibility of procedure (p.1). A document published
by citizensadvice.org.uk states that the main advantages of using ADR are: (. . . )
the procedure is less formal than going to court (. . . ), the procedure is condential
(https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/Documents/Advice%20factsheets/Consumer%20A¤a
irs/c-alternative-dispute-resolution.pdf). Last, the US Agency for International Develop-
ment reports that If the main problems with the courts are complex and inappropriate
procedures(. . . ) ADR programs can provide streamlined procedures to accelerate case dis-
position(p.9) (https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/les/documents/1868/200sbe.pdf).
8Their model has provided the base setup for a number of other papers, see e.g. Corchon
(2007), Hirschleifer and Osborne (2001), and Garcia, Reitzes and Benavides (2005).
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can now invert (3) to solve for the level of e¤ective legal argument that i can
nance therewith:
emi =

m
i
(cmi   Fm)
1=m
: (5)
Substituting (5) into (1) and writing the i in terms of , we obtain for the
probability that party 1 wins the conict:9
qm1 (c
m
1 ; c
m
2 ; ) =
m m (cm1   Fm)
m m (cm1   Fm) +  m (cm2   Fm)
(6)
where m =


1 
1=m
and  m (cmi   Fm) = (cmi   Fm)1=
m
. The Farmer
and Pecorino (1999) framework obtains for the parameters m = 1 and Fm =
0. Alternatively, setting  = 1=2 and Fm = 0 yields an environment which
satises the assumptions discussed in Corchon (2007). In other words, the
framework developped in the current paper nests the standard models that
apply Tullock games to study court behavior.10
Second, in order to focus on the comparison between ADR and litigation,
we do not consider out-of-court settlements. In any case, many conicts are
not resolved by an out-of-court agreement. Hence, an interpretation is that
we target those cases.
Third, we also ruled out the possibility of a side payment which a party
may o¤er in order to inuence her opponents decision of a dispute resolu-
tion forum. This may be relevant because litigation is the fall back position.
Hence if i prefers ADR, but her opponent favors litigation, in the absence
of a side payment the conict will be resolved in court. A side payment
could motivate the latter to accept ADR as a conict resolution mechanism
which would be e¢ ciency improving if is gain is larger than the side pay-
ment. However, with the interpretation that our analysis focuses on the set
of conicts where parties could not settle out-of-court, it seemed to us un-
realistic that the same individuals could agree on side payments. Moreover,
the di¤erent attempts to incentivize ADR suggests that according to policy
makers conicts are too often resolved in court which suggests that for these
cases side payments were not agreed upon.
9To reduce the complexity of notation and avoid confusion, we write: qmi (c
m
1 ; c
m
2 ; ) 
pi (e
m
1 (c
m
1 ; c
m
2 ; ) ; e
m
2 (c
m
1 ; c
m
2 ; ))
10An alternative would have been to start our model directly with equation (6). We de-
cided against it because we felt that it masks the relationship between the aforementioned
formalism of legal courts and the way it impacts the winning probabilities.
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3 The Nash Equilibrium of the Tullock Con-
test
In this section, we analyze the partiesincentive to invest in e¤ective legal
argument and solve for the Nash equilibrium. At this stage of the game, the
conict resolution method m and the characteristics (;D) associated with
the conict have already been determined and are known to both sides. In
their respective optimization problem, each party rationally anticipates the
e¤ective legal e¤ort produced by her opponent. Accordingly, party i solves:
max
ei0
ei
ei + amj
D   Fm   i
e
m
i
m
s.t. (2) (I)
whereby amj denotes the Nash equilibrium in e¤ective legal argument of party
j. To keep notation to a minimum, we use the following convention in the
remainder of the paper; party j always denotes is opponent and vice versa
(i.e. if i = 1 then j = 2 etc.). The objective function in (I) is strictly
concave so that is optimal response to his expectation about her opponents
behavior, amj > 0, becomes implicitly dened by the rst-order condition of
(I):11
amj 
ei + amj
2D   iem 1i = 0 : (7)
There is a symmetric expression dening js optimal response. Together
these response functions dene the Nash equilibrium. We summarize our
ndings in the ensuing result.
Proposition 1 At the Nash equilibrium, both disputants allocate the same
amount of resources to their e¤ective legal argument. Moreover, contestant i
produces the e¤ective e¤ort:
ami =
0B@ 1=mi 1=mj

1=m
j + 
1=m
i
2 Di
1CA
1=m
i; j = 1; 2 (8)
11Observe that (am1 ; a
m
2 ) = (0; 0) cannot be a Nash equilibrium. For a
m
j = 0 a small
increase in ai from 0 to " leads to a discrete jump in i0s probability to win from 1=2 to
1 for a marginal increase in costs. For amj > 0 satisfying (7) leads to ei > 0. Note that
the argument assumes even ei = 0 the parties pay Fm. Intuitively, even in the absence
of any e¤ort towards an e¤ective legal argument the party must still show up at the
conict resolution forum. An alternative is to assume D > FL. We ignore the issue in the
remainder.
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Proof. Multiplying i and js rst-order condition respectively with ami and
amj leads to the equality:
i (a
m
i )
m = j
 
amj
m ; i; j = 1; 2 (9)
It implies that at the Nash equilibrium both partiesvariable costs must be
equal. Adding the xed costs veries the rst claim.
Using (9) to solve for amj , we obtain:
amj =

i
j
1=m
ami ; i; j = 1; 2 : (10)
We can now substitute (10) into is rst-order condition. Rearranging the
resulting equality and cancelling identical terms immediately yields (8).
We can use the foregoing result to solve for the Nash Equilibrium costs as
a function of the mechanism resolution forum m and the conict character-
istics denoted hereafter by  m(;D). Specically, substituting (8) and (9),
and using (2), we obtain:
 m (;D) = Fm + 1=m
(1  )1=m1=m
((1  )1=m + 1=m)2D : (11)
The structure of  m (;D) implies that the Nash equilibrium costs are sym-
metric in  around  = 1=2, i.e.  m (;D) =  m (1  ;D). Intuitively, it
does not matter whether it is disputant 1 who has a meritorious claim and 2 a
demeritorious one, or the reverse. Taking the derivative of (11) with respect
 gives the impact of making the contest more balanced ( < 1=2) or less
balanced ( > 1=2) on the level of equilibrium costs. While cumbersome, it
is nonetheless easily veried that
@ m
@
=
D
(m)2
(1  ) 1m 1  1m 1
(1  ) 1m +  1m
3 (1  ) 1m    1m  : (12)
On the RHS of (12), the rst two fractions are clearly positive. Hence,
 m (;D) is increasing in  for 0    1
2
, decreasing otherwise and takes a
maximum at  = 1
2
, i.e. when the partiesclaim appear to have equal merit.
Figure 1 plots the case Fm = 0, m = 2 and D = 100.
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Figure 1: Disputants Costs at the Nash Equilibrium
Due to the symmetry, we only discuss the interpretation of the graph from
the perspective of party 1. Keeping in mind that at the Nash equilibrium
both have the same costs, equation (6) simplies and can be written as:
qm1 ( 
m;  m; ) =
1=
m
1=
m
+ (1  )1=m
(13)
As  converges to the extremes, either 1 almost surely loses ( ! 0) or al-
most surely wins ( ! 1). In both cases, the disadvantaged party has no
benet to spend any resources. As a response, the meritorious party has
also no incentives to invest. Altogether, neither party incurs spending. As
 moves toward the center of the support, the marginal benet of the disad-
vantaged party increases inducing him to spend more resources. This induces
her opponent to also raise spending. Finally, when  = 1=2 both claims are
equally meritorious and total costs are at their highest level. Moreover, at
the Nash equilibrium both contestants have the same chance of winning.
4 Litigation versus ADR: A Comparison
In this section, we compare the Nash equilibria associated with the respective
conict resolution mechanism. We successively examine how the choice of m
impacts the partieschances of winning, their expected utility and associated
costs.
4.1 Winning probabilities
We only consider party 1. Due to the symmetry around  = 1=2, a similar
logic then extends to the second party. Taking the derivative of (13) with
11
respect to m yields
@qm1
@m
( m;  m; ) =
(m) 2 (1  )1=m 1=m
(1  )1=m + 1=m
2 ln 1   : (14)
The rst fraction on the RHS of (14) is positive. Accordingly, the sign
of @q
m
1
@m
is determined by ln 1 

; for  2 (0; 1=2) it is positive, at  = 1=2
it vanishes and it is negative otherwise. This means that when the parties
switch from ADR to litigation which produces an increase in the cost elas-
ticity to produce e¤ective legal arguments, the winning probability of the
disadvantaged party (i.e.  < 1=2 in the case of party 1) increases. Con-
versely, the winning probability of the advantaged party (i.e.  > 1=2 from
the perspective of party 1) decreases.
Proposition 2 Comparing the Nash equilibria associated with litigation and
ADR, we nd that the probability of winning the legal contest by the disputant
with the meritorious claim becomes smaller under litigation. Symmetrically,
the winning probability of the party with the demeritorious claim becomes
larger.
Proof. The claim follows directly from (14) and L > A by assumption 1.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of proposition 2 using the
numerical values A = 2 and L = 4. The graphic plots contestant 10s
winning probabilities under litigation and ADR by the solid and the dashed
curve respectively.
Figure 2: Winning probabilities of contestant 1 at the Nash equilibrium
There are three points in the diagram where judicial litigation and ADR
produce the same chances of winning. First, as  converges to 1 the situation
12
becomes increasingly advantageous to disputant 1. As the marginal cost of
e¤ective legal argument for party 1 converges to zero, individual 2 realizes
he has no chance of winning; am2 converges to 0 and disputant 1 wins almost
certainly. Second, at the other extreme where  converges to 0, the roles of
the disputants are reversed and party 1 almost never wins. Finally, when
 = 1=2 the claim of both appear to have equal merit. As discussed in the
foregoing section, both partieswinning chance become equal at 1=2.
In all the other cases, 1s winning probability across the two conict res-
olution mechanisms evolves di¤erently. When the cost elasticity is high (i.e.
using the court system), both parties reduce their e¤ective legal argument as
compared to a situation where the cost elasticity is smaller (as under ADR).
The reduction in e¤ective legal arguments means that the winning probabil-
ities are more determined by luck and converge to 1=2. This is negative for
the party with the more meritorious case (i.e.  > 1=2), but benecial for
her opponent.
4.2 Procedural e¢ ciency
In this subsection, we focus on the total costs at the Nash equilibrium as-
sociated with the respective conict resolution mechanism. From (11), we
concluded that under either conict resolution mechanism the variable costs
go to zero as  converges to the end points of the support. Hence, given that
the respective xed costs satisfy FL > FA, we conclude that for cases where
the claim of one party becomes overwhelmingly meritorious, ADR is clearly
more cost e¤ective and, hence, procedurally e¢ cient.
At the other extreme, consider the situation where both claims have equal
merit, i.e.  = 1=2. Using (11) to calculate the variable costs at the Nash
equilibrium, V Cm (;D), we obtain:
V Cm

1
2
; D

=
D
4m
: (15)
Given that L > A we obtain that with equal merit variable costs under
litigation are always smaller than with ADR. Intuitively, the higher elasticity
parameter associated with going to court su¢ ciently reduces the parties
incentive for a legal ght to compensate for the higher power of the costs
function and to guarantee V CL
 
1
2
; D

< V CA
 
1
2
; D

. Accordingly, if the
xed costs di¤erential is not too large, litigation remains more cost e¢ cient.
Next result summarizes the nding.
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Proposition 3 Suppose the cost parameters and the disputed value D satisfy
FL +
D
4L
< FA +
D
4A
: (16)
In that case, there are situations where litigation becomes procedurally more
e¢ cient than ADR at the Nash equilibrium.
Inequality (16) can be rewritten as follows
FL   FA
D
<
1
4
(
1
A
  1
L
): (17)
Accordingly, litigation is more likely to be procedurally e¢ cient for large D
and/or small xed costs di¤erences FL   FA).
Figure 3 exemplies the case of proposition 3 for the parameter constella-
tion D = 100, FA = 0, FL = 2, A = 2 and L = 4. The graphic follows the
same convention as in the foregoing gure where the dashed and the solid
curve represent the respective curves associated with ADR and litigation.
Figure 3: Cost comparison at the Nash Equilibria
As discussed above, at the extremes of the support the xed costs di¤er-
ential dominates so that ADR is clearly more cost e¤ective. As the situation
across contestants becomes more balanced ( moves towards the center) the
variable costs associated with litigation grow more slowly than those asso-
ciated with ADR. In the gure, the xed costs di¤erential becomes exactly
o¤set by the change in variable costs for  h 0:05 and  h 1   0:05. Ac-
cordingly, for merit allocations such that 0:05 <  < 0:95; litigation becomes
more advantageous. Finally, observe that in Figure 3, the condition (16) is
satised since at  = 1=2 the solid curve is below the dashed one.
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4.3 Utilities comparison
In the foregoing subsection on procedural e¢ ciency, the costs associated with
the respective dispute resolution mechanisms were decisive for the compar-
ison. However, from the point of view of a contestant what matters for his
choice between litigation and ADR is not cost but rather his expected utility
associated with the corresponding method.
As in subsection 4.1 we focus without loss of generality on party 1s
problem. Assuming the parties have agreed to employ the resolution method
m, the Nash Equilibrium utility of party 1 is given by:
um1 (;D) = q
m
1 ( 
m(;D);  m(;D); )D    m(;D) (18)
Proposition 4 Suppose the cost parameters and the disputed value D satisfy
(16), then we have uL1 (1=2; D) > u
A
1 (1=2; D)
Proof. Keeping in mind that at  = 1=2, the winning probabilities are the
same for both mechanisms, we have uL1 (1=2; D) uA1 (1=2; D) =  A(1=2; D) 
 L(1=2; D) > 0 by (16).
As an illustration, we use the foregoing numerical example to plot the util-
ity of contestant 1 associated with ADR (dashed curve) and litigation (solid
curve). Given that the example satises the condition (16), as predicted
by proposition 4 contestant 1 has a higher Nash utility under litigation for
 = 1=2.
Figure 4: um1 for F
A = 0, FL = 2, A = 2 and L = 4
The point of intersection between the two utility curves, denoted by I1
hereafter, plays a key role in the remainder. As we can see from graphic, in
the situation represented by Figure 4 individual 1 prefers litigation for any
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merit allocation which satises  < I1 = 0:65. This is obviously specic to
the parameters which were selected. Suppose, we keep the variables FA, A
and L constant, but we increase the x costs associated with litigation. For
every , this would lower the utility associated with litigation. Geometrically,
it means that the solid curve is shifted downward while leaving the dashed
curve remains una¤ected as illustrated in Figure 5. As a result, the intersec-
tion between the two utility curves, i.e. I1, shifts to the left. For su¢ ciently
large litigation xed costs, the condition (16) is no longer satised and the
inequality in Proposition 4 is reversed. Accordingly, the intersection of the
two curves occurs at a point I1 < 1=2. For instance, with F
L = 10, we have:
Figure 5: um1 for F
A = 0, FL = 10, A = 2 and L = 4
5 Selecting the Dispute Resolution Forum
In this section, we distinguish two possible timings for the decision of a dis-
pute resolution forum. We rst consider a case where the parties decision is
made ex-post that is once the conict has arisen and the allocation of merit
is known to the constestants. This type of conguration would automati-
cally arise whenever conict parties are not contractually bound prior to the
occurence of a conict.
Next, we analyze the opposite case where the parties decide ex-ante which
forum to choose in the event of a future conict. That setup is likely to
occur for commercial disputes where the parties can envisage how to deal
with potential future disagreements at the signature of the initial contract.
In either case, the fall back dispute resolution forum is the one guaranteed
by civil law. Accordingly, unless both parties agree to the use of ADR (ex-
ante or ex-post), they will resolve their dispute in court. This arrangement
naturally creates a strong bias towards litigation.
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5.1 Ex-post choice
To start with consider the parameter constellationD = 100, FA = 0, FL = 2,
A = 2 and L = 4 which was used for drawing Figures 3 and 4. Using
these parameters, we concluded in subsection 4.3 that party 1 would favor
litigation whenever the merit of her case satises  < 0:65 and ADR for
 > 0:65. However, by a symmetric argument contestant 2 will prefer to go
to court whenever the meritoriousness of his case satises (1  ) < 0:65 or
equivalently for  > 0:35. On the other hand, he would agree to ADR for
 < 0:35.
Obviously, for the numerical example represented in Figures 3 and 4, there
is no merit allocation where both parties simultaneous agree to ADR despite
the fact that litigation is only procedurally e¢ cient 0:05 <  < 0:95.12 While
the conclusion is specic to the parameters used in this example, the logic is
more general and summarized in the next result.
Proposition 5 Suppose the cost parameters and the disputed value D satisfy
(16), then there is no merit allocation (; 1  ) where parties agree to ADR.
Proof. From the foregoing subsection, we know that (16) implies that I1 >
1=2. Moreover, by proposition 4 party 1 prefers ADR if and only if  
I1 > 1=2. However by symmetry, party 2 prefers ADR if and only if 1  
I1 > 1=2, hence for  < 1=2: Clearly no merit allocation can satisfy both
requirements.
Situations captured by Proposition 5 leads to a tension between proce-
dural e¢ ciency and the decisions taken by parties whenever ADR becomes
procedurally e¢ cient. For instance, in the above example for  =2 [0:05; 0:95]
though ADR is procedurally e¢ cient, by Proposition 5 one party always nds
it advantageous to block the use of ADR. This type of tension will always
occur when (17) is satised, for instance, for su¢ ciently large D. In those
situations the parties are not e¢ cient decision makers.
The tension between the procedurally e¢ cient method and the decision
by the parties becomes maximal in situations where the RHS and the LHS
of (16) are exactly equal. In that case, ADR is procedurally e¢ cient for
all possible merit allocation. Nevertheless, the parties would always choose
litigation! Geometrically, this occurs when in an analogon to Figure 3, the
full curve (i.e. the litigation costs) is shifted upward (for instance, by an
increase in FL) in such a way that the two costs curve become tangent at
 = 1=2. In this case, in the equivalent of Figure 4 the utility curves intersect
at  = 1=2. Hence, for  < 1=2 party 1 prefers ADR while party 2 prefers
12See the discussion of Figure 3 on page 4.2.
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litigation. For  > 1=2 the roles are reversed. Hence despite the fact that
ADR is procedurally e¢ cient in every case, the contestants always end up in
court.
The aforementioned tension between procedural e¢ ciency and the parties
decision disappears for a su¢ ciently small D or a xed costs di¤erential that
is large enough. For instance, in the foregoing numerical example, setting
FL  16 while holding the other parameter constant yields such a case. The
next graphic is an analogon to Figure 5 where the full curve (i.e. expected
utility under litigation) has been su¢ ciently shifted downward by setting
FL = 16 that it is entirely below the dotted curve. Intuitively, the higher
xed cost FL makes litigation su¢ ciently costly to induce both constestants
to always agree to ADR for all merit allocation. Moreover, with FL  10
this is also e¢ cient.
Figure 6: um1 for F
A = 0, FL = 16, L = 4 and A = 2
A similar result obtains for su¢ ciently small D (holding Fl unchanged).
Intuitively, these are situations where the benet to the weaker party of going
to court su¢ ciently decreases to make ADR attactive for both sides.
5.2 Ex-ante choice
In this subsection, we consider the situation where the parties can contractu-
ally agree beforehand on the conict resolution forum to be chosen should the
need arise in some future. In order to analyze the partiesforum choice, we
need to extend the foregoing model to include the partiesanticipation at the
contracting stage about the characteristic of a future conict. For the sake of
economy, we suppose thatD is known, but  is not.13 We denote byH () the
13From (18), we know that the ex-post utility is linear in D. Accordingly, even if D was
not yet known at the time of contracting, our conclusion would be una¤ected if D and 
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cumulative distribution of meritoriousness over the support (0; 1). Moreover,
we assume that h () = H 0 () is symmetric around 1=2. Keeping in mind the
relationship between i and , it implies Pr
h
1  ei = Pr h2  ei for alle 2 (0; 1). Due to this symmetry, we can continue to focus on the decision
problem of party 1.
Consider a conict situation where the parties have agreed to the conict
resolution mechanism m and the allocation of meritoriousness is (; 1  ).
The Nash equilibrium of the Tullock game in e¤ective e¤ort takes the exact
same form as in section 3 so that the partiesrespective e¤ective legal argu-
ment is given by (8). Ex-ante the contestants will anticipate this outcome so
that party 1s expected utility becomes:
E [um1 ] = E

am1 ()
am1 () + a
m
2 ()
D   Fm   V Cm(;D)

. (19)
In order to derive which of the two conict resolution forum it should favor,
party 1 solves for the di¤erence E [u1] = E

uL1
   E uA1 . Note however
the following equality
E

aL1 ()
aL1 () + a
L
2 ()

= E

aA1 ()
aA1 () + a
A
2 ()

(20)
which follows from the double symmetry h() = h(1   ) and  () =
  (1  ) where14
 () =
aL1 ()
aL1 () + a
L
2 ()
  a
A
1 ()
aA1 () + a
A
2 ()
(21)
Accordingly, the di¤erence E [u1] simplies and becomes:
E [u1] = F
L   FA + E V CL(;D)  V CA(;D) (22)
were independently distributed random variables. In that case, we would interpret of D
as the expected value of the monetary equivalent of the conict.
14Geometrically, this can be seen in Figure 2. More generally, observe that using (13)
the equality  () =   (1  ) follows because
1 =
1=
L
+ (1  )1=L
1=
L
+ (1  )1=L
=
1=
A
+ (1  )1=A
1=
A
+ (1  )1=A
= 1
or equivalently
1=
L
1=
L
+ (1  )1=L
  
1=A
1=
A
+ (1  )1=A
=
(1  )1=A
1=
A
+ (1  )1=A
  (1  )
1=L
1=
L
+ (1  )1=L
:
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The simplication has an immediate implication summarized in the next
result.
Proposition 6 Suppose that for the parameters FA; FL; L; A and D the
conict resolution forum ADR is procedurally e¢ cient for all  2 (0; 1).
Then the parties nd it optimal to contract ex-ante to use ADR should a
future conict arise.
The stark contrast between the propositions 5 and 6 associating the ex-
post versus ex-ante decision is best seen when the RHS and LHS of (16) are
equal. We noted in the foregoing subsection that in such a context ADR is
procedurally e¢ ciency for all the feasible merit allocation, but that in the
case of an ex-post decision the parties would nevertheless end up in court.
In contrast, with an ex-ante agreement proposition 6 implies that the parties
would contractually bind themselves to use ADR should a conict arise.
Suppose, we now reduce FL slightly. Hence, in a ball just that around  =
1=2 litigation becomes cost e¢ cient, but otherwise ADR remains procedurally
better. In this case, ex-ante the parties would continue to agree on ADR as
E [ui] > 0. Accordingly, evaluating the ex-post e¢ ciency of an ex-ante
agreement on the conict resolution forum, we nd that contrary to the
foregoing subsection, parties may now employ ADR too often.
6 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we present a model to study the choice of a conict resolution
forum by disputants. A maintained hypothesis in our analysis is that ADR
mechanisms are less formal than court procedure, impose fewer constraints
on the collection and presentation of information, allow for condentiality
and generally lead to shorter delays than litigation. Since ADR mechanisms
impose fewer constraints, cost and cost elasticity of producing e¤ective legal
arguments are assumed to be lower than for litigation.
We analyze the aforementioned environment to analyze the partiesbe-
haviors in court and ADR processes. We show that litigation may generate
less spending at the Nash equilibrium and become procedurally more e¢ cient.
Intuitively, the larger cost elasticity acts as a commitment device inducing
the parties to restrict spending.
However, the partiesdecisions with respect to the choice of a conict
resolution forum depend on their respective benet in an environment where
litigation is the fallback position. This may create some tension between
the choice made by the disputants and procedural e¢ ciency. This tension is
the higher, (i) the lower the xed costs di¤erential between court and ADR,
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(ii) the higher the compensation, and (iii) the more unbalanced the parties
are at the beginning. We also show that the timing of the decision matters.
When the conict resolution method is determined by the parties before the
conict arises, ADR may be chosen too frequently. When the choice is made
after the conict arises, litigation is used too often.
These results allow us to discuss the identity of the decision maker and
the timing of the choice with regard to the decision on the conict resolution
method. As stated in the introduction, there is a wide range of situations
across jurisdictions; in some environments disputants are free to choose the
method they wish, and in other cases ADR is imposed by the law and/or
decided by the judge.
We also believe that our model helps to better understand observed prac-
tices. ADR is widely used in some elds of law while it remains little con-
sidered in some others. For instance, 78 616 civil cases have voluntarily been
through conciliation in 2013 in France (+24,7% compared to 2012) (IGSJ
(2015)). However, compared to the 717 379 new cases brought in civil courts
in 2013, conciliation still represents a small part of the total caseload. On the
opposite, conciliation or arbitration clauses are widely chosen in commercial
contracts. For instance, 90% of contracts in international trade have a clause
allowing for arbitration in case of conicts between the parties.15 Our model
contributes to shed a new light on these observations by identifying several
factors explaining the choice between these alternatives.
Regarding policy recommandations, our results show that the disputants
choice is not always consistent with procedural e¢ ciency, so that transferring
the decision to the judge may avoid ine¢ ciency. Moreover, we nd that ADR
is not always the best method to minimize global costs, which implies that it
should not be always demanded. For instance, when the xed cost di¤erential
is low and the compensation D is high, ADR is likely to entail overspending,
such that litigation may be more e¢ cient, i.e. leads to lower total costs
incurred by the two parties.
In our analysis, we model the contest between the parties by a Tullock
game. Using a di¤erent game form may yield di¤erent results in terms of the
cost comparison. However, the conclusion with respect to the ex-post and
ex-ante tension is likely to remain. The intuition is that ex-post the parties
clearly have divergent interests as long as the costs are too high relative to the
benets. Conversely, assuming meritoriousness is symmetrically distributed,
we should still nd that the expected benet adds up to zero. Accordingly,
it will be the cost di¤erence that will matter.
15Source:http://www.a¢ ches-parisiennes.com/l-entreprise-face-au-choix-de-l-arbitrage-
4213.html)
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A number of signicant factors are absent from our analysis. For instance,
we ignore the issues relating to publication of judgments, which obviously
di¤ers from court to ADR, since ADR typically allows for condentiality. In
addition, we subsumed all the di¤erent forms of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms into a single scheme. In reality, there are considerable di¤erences
between mediation, conciliation and arbitration etc. All these items provide
interesting avenues for future research.
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